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Abstract 
 
Dual system and dual process views of the human mind have contrasted automatic, fast, 
and non-conscious with controlled, slow, and conscious thinking. This paper integrates 
duality models from the perspective of consumer psychology by identifying three 
relevant theoretical strands: Persuasion and attitude change (e.g. Elaboration Likelihood 
Model), judgment and decision making (e.g. Intuitive vs. Reflective Model), as well as 
buying and consumption behavior (e.g. Reflective-Impulsive Model). Covering 
different aspects of the consumer decision making process, we discuss the conditions 
under which different types of processes are evoked, how they interact and how they 
apply to consumers’ processing of marketing messages, the evaluation of product-
related information, and purchasing behavior. We further compare and contrast 
theoretical strands and incorporate them with the literature on attitudes, showing how 
duality models can help us understand implicit and explicit attitude formation in 
consumer psychology. Finally, we offer future research implications for scholars in 
consumer psychology and marketing. 
 
Keywords: dual systems, dual processes, judgment and decision making, heuristics and 
biases, attitudes, persuasion, attitude change, consumer behavior, impulsive buying, 
marketing psychology 
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1. Introduction 
The last time you bought a television set, how considered was your purchase? Was it 
influenced mainly by a careful weighing up of factors like price and product features, or 
might there have been other less conscious processes that influenced your purchase of a 
particular brand? How did you evaluate the marketing messages to which you had been 
exposed prior to your buying decision, and what attitudes had you formed already about the 
brand as a result? When you entered the electronics store, did your buying intentions guide 
you or did you suddenly find yourself purchasing a different and more expensive set 
altogether? Duality models, the subject of this review, can help us understand the psychology 
of the consumer at different stages of the consumer purchase decision making process. 
Over the last two decades, psychologists have distinguished between two systems of 
thought with different capacities and processes (Evans 2003, 2008; Kahneman 2011; 
Kahneman and Frederick 2002; Metcalfe and Mischel 1999; Sloman 1996; Smith and 
DeCoster 2000; Strack and Deutsch 2004), which have been referred to as System 1 and 
System 2 (Stanovich and West 2000). System 1 (S1) consists of high-capacity intuitive 
thoughts, draws on associations that are acquired through experience, and computes 
information quickly and automatically. System 2 (S2), on the other hand, involves low-
capacity reflective thinking, draws on rules that are acquired through culture or formal 
learning, and computes information in a relatively slow and controlled fashion. Processes 
associated with these systems have been referred to as Type 1 (fast, automatic, unconscious) 
and Type 2 (slow, conscious, controlled), respectively (Frankish and Evans 2009). The dual 
system perspective has become increasingly popular, even outside of academia following the 
publication of Daniel Kahneman’s book Thinking, Fast and Slow (2011)1. 
The contribution of our paper is threefold. First, we provide a structured overview of 
duality models in the field of consumer psychology. Some scholars have reviewed dual 
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system and dual process theories as they have emerged in different areas of psychology, 
including social inference, judgment and decision making, and reasoning (Carruthers 2012; 
Evans, 2008; Frankish and Evans 2009). However, these discussions have not included 
models on buying and consumption behavior and there have been no systematic reviews of 
duality models through the lens of consumer psychology, looking at models from different 
sub-fields of psychology. We discuss duality models across three different theoretical strands: 
Persuasion and attitude change, judgment and decision making, and buying and consumption 
behavior. Our objective is not to provide an exhaustive review of each strand, but to show 
how different streams of research taken together give a fuller picture of consumer decision 
making, including the effect of persuasive marketing messages, product evaluations, and 
purchasing behaviors. We constrain our review of each strand to the aspects necessary to 
understand how and why each model can be characterized as a duality model, and how it 
functions as such. Second, we integrate these theories by comparing and contrasting 
processes and systems across each strand, and then showing how the different areas can be 
connected to the core marketing concept of attitudes. We further demonstrate how the two 
types of processes and systems (S1 and S2) can be related in each strand with the formation 
of implicit and explicit attitudes. Finally, we offer a series of research implications derived 
from our systematic review of the ’duality of mind’ literature. 
 
2. Duality Models in Consumer Psychology: An Overview 
We identify three strands associated with dual process and dual system models that 
are relevant to consumer psychology: Persuasion and attitude change, judgment and decision 
making, and buying and consumption behavior. As representatives of the persuasion and 
attitude change area, we discuss two well-known dual process theories, namely the 
Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM; Petty and Cacioppo 1986) and the Heuristic-Systematic 
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Model (HSM; Chaiken 1980). In the judgment and decision making tradition, we focus on 
two dual system models that have been used to explain the findings of research on general 
purpose heuristics, namely the Intuitive vs. Reflective (Kahneman and Frederick 2002; cf. 
Kahneman 2011) as well as the associated Experiential vs. Analytic (Slovic, Finucane, Peters, 
and MacGregor 2002; cf. Epstein 1994) systems. Finally, we look at buying and consumption 
behaviors and explain the theoretical context and processes outlined in the Reflective-
Impulsive dual systems model (RIM; Strack and Deutsch 2004; Strack, Werth, and Deutsch 
2006), which partly draws on the Hot/Cool model on the dynamics of willpower (Metcalfe 
and Mischel 1999). 
For the purpose of integration, these strands can be mapped onto standard consumer 
decision making stages, which begin with problem recognition, followed by an (internal and 
external) information search, consideration set formation, the evaluation of alternatives, 
choice/purchase, as well as post-purchase evaluation (Blackwell, Miniard, and Engel, 2006; 
Hoyer and MacInnis 2003). This process represents an ideal type scenario, since we can 
expect variations in the time scale, composition and sequence of stages. In the persuasion 
strand, consumers exposed to marketing communications can rely on peripheral cues and 
process information heuristically or they can take a central route and process information 
systematically, which may lead to attitude change. Since the aim of traditional marketing, 
especially advertising, is to influence consumer memory and attitudes (including wants and 
perceived needs) (e.g. Blackwell et al. 2006), this strand affects decision making as early as 
at the problem recognition and information search stages. In judgment and decision making 
dual system views, consumers evaluate products by relying on easily accessible information 
in memory or affect (S1) or process information reflectively by weighing up costs and 
benefits (S2). This strand thus pertains to consumer decision making mainly in the middle 
stages, especially the evaluation of alternatives. Finally, in the buying and consumption 
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behavior strand, consumer choices may be influenced by processes in impulsive or reflective 
systems, ultimately leading to considered choices (via reflective, S2, thought) influenced by 
prior evaluations and intentions, or unplanned choices (via S1 impulses). Figure 1 presents an 
overview of these strands. 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Evans (2007, 2008) further distinguished between two forms of duality models: 
Parallel-competitive and default-interventionist. The main differences between the two relate 
to the order and dominance of different cognitive processes. In a parallel-competitive type of 
model, dual processes can occur in parallel, leading to conflicting or competing attempts to 
control the results of thinking. In Evans’ view, the Heuristic-Systematic (HSM) model and 
the Experiential vs. Rational perspective (upon which the Experiential vs. Analytic model is 
based) correspond more closely to a parallel-competitive type. Default-interventionist 
theories of dual processing, on the other hand, suggest that automatic and fast (S1) processes 
propose answers to problems that then enter reflective (S2) processing. This is done by 
default. If S2 intervenes, the content provided by S1 may or may not be endorsed. Evans cites 
the Intuitive vs. Reflective model as a default-interventionist type. 
Although Evans does not include duality models of consumer behavior in his review 
and typology, the Reflective-Impulsive Model (RIM) appears to fit his parallel-competitive 
description, while the Hot/Cool model (upon which the RIM partly builds) is akin to a 
default-interventionist structure. Yet, not all theories reviewed here can be fitted into this 
distinction—the ELM does not constitute either one of Evans’ processing types. We refer to 
Evans’ typology throughout our review and further discuss the relevance of this distinction 
for duality models—including recent challenges—later in this article. 
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In the following sections, we review the duality strands of persuasion and attitude 
change, judgment and decision making, as well as buying and consumption behavior. These 
research domains did not develop in isolation, but can be seen as prototypical streams in 
which duality theories have emerged. Dual system views have mainly served as explanatory 
frameworks for integrating past research findings (the Intuitive vs. Reflective model in 
judgment and decision making) or existing theories (the RIM in the buying and consumption 
strand). Dual process views (the ELM and HSM in persuasion and attitude change), by 
contrast, are the product of more traditional hypothesis testing and theory building. In each 
section, we discuss the theoretical underpinnings and applications of these models to 
consumer research, while highlighting the conditions under which different processes are 
evoked and how they interact. Finally, we conclude each section with a review of recent 
developments in the area. 
 
3. Dual Process Models in Attitude Change and Persuasion 
Dual processing is probably best known to marketing scholars in the context of 
persuasion and attitude change studies, frequently used in advertising research. The concept 
of attitude has occupied a central place in both social psychology (Allport 1935) and 
consumer psychology (MacKenzie, Lutz, and Belch 1986). Traditional conceptualizations of 
attitude change and persuasion were known as cognitive-response models of persuasion 
(Greenwald 1968; Wright 1980), suggesting that persuasion attempts trigger a simple and 
systematic cognitive response from individuals trying to make sense of new information by 
confronting it with existing information. These simplistic models, which relied on single-
effect and single-process routes and were too often contradicted by empirical data (Petty and 
Brinol 2008), were quickly abandoned by researchers who turned towards dual process 
models to better understand persuasion and attitude change. Two key models emerged and 
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offered a better way to distinguish between the processes and the content of persuasion: The 
Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM, Petty, and Cacioppo 1986), which is more prevalent in 
the literature2, and the Heuristic-Systematic Model (HSM; Chaiken, 1980; Eagly and 
Chaiken 1993). 
3.1 The Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) 
The ELM investigates two types of information processing strategies used by 
individuals to engage with persuasion materials, such as argument content, the source of a 
message, the design of visual information, or expert opinions. Individuals can engage in 
effortful information processing in order to construct strong and accurate attitudes (central 
route), or they can limit cognitive efforts and form weak or imprecise attitudes (peripheral 
route; Petty and Cacioppo 1986; Petty et al. 1981, 1983). In the central route, consumers 
usually assess the quality of arguments. For example, people may consider the logic behind a 
sequence of arguments, or the perceived accuracy of the comparison process of one brand 
with another in the case of comparative advertising. In the peripheral route, emotional 
messages, the attractiveness of the source of communication, or product aesthetics are 
examples of elements that can serve as shortcuts in judging the quality of a product. 
According to Petty, Cacioppo, and Schumann (1983), motivation to process information is 
the key factor that determines which route will be used. 
Petty et al. (1983) introduced the ELM in a classic study on advertising effects, in 
which participants were exposed to a magazine ad for a razor—endorsed by either an athlete 
or a non-famous citizen—and subsequently asked for their attitudes and purchase intentions. 
Participants’ involvement was manipulated by telling them that they would receive a razor as 
a gift and that the advertised razor would soon be test-marketed in their area (high 
involvement). Alternatively, they were informed that would receive a gift from a different 
category (toothpaste) and the product would be test-marketed in a different region (low 
Duality Models in Consumer Psychology    7 
 
involvement). Results showed an effect of celebrity status on product attitudes when 
involvement was low, whereas the persuasiveness of the message itself was a strong 
determinant in product evaluations when involvement was high. 
Research also showed that a combination of contextual factors, dispositions, and level 
of involvement can determine whether a cue is processed using a central or a peripheral route 
(Maclnnis and Jaworski 1989; Payne, Bettman, and Johnson 1993). A consumer’s variation 
in the degree of involvement in processing messages can be due to the amount of cognitive 
resources available—in the form of time pressure or cognitive load—or to a feeling that the 
information to be processed is irrelevant or non-essential to the achievement of her goals. For 
instance, manipulating individuals’ cognitive capacity (by asking participants to perform two 
simultaneous tasks) or involvement in the task (by suggesting to participants that their 
answers are more or less important to the researcher) can result in greater use of peripheral 
cues over central cues (Reinhard and Sporer 2008). Finally, consumer involvement in 
information processing will vary depending on expertise in the product category. Previous 
research has suggested that experts value in-depth information processing, whereas novices 
tend to find in-depth information processing time-consuming and unhelpful (see Alba and 
Hutchinson 1987). Consequently, expert consumers are more likely to use the central route 
when processing information that pertains to their expertise. 
Other contextual factors that influence elaboration likelihood and the weight given to 
different cues are mood variations, where positive moods lead to less message scrutiny 
(Howard and Barry 1994) or more message scrutiny if the message is mood-enhancing 
(Wegener, Petty and Smith 1995); individual goals, where an interest in holding accurate 
attitudes is related to more judgment correction using the central route (Meyers-Levy and 
Malaviya 1999); and physiological arousal, where high arousal is associated with greater 
sensitivity to peripheral cues (Sanbonmatsu and Kardes 1988). With respect to dispositions, 
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individuals who like to engage in extensive information processing (high need for cognition, 
Cacioppo, Petty, and Morris 1983) process arguments using the central route, compared with 
individuals who do not (Haugtvedt and Petty 1992). Finally, when a message matches an 
individual’s self-schemas, he is more likely to engage in elaboration (Wheeler, Petty, and 
Bizer 2005). 
Some cues in persuasion and attitudes change can be used by both processes (see 
Multiple Role Model, Haugtvedt and Kasmer 2008). For instance, brand names have been 
shown to influence attitudes both as a peripheral cue (Maheswaran, Mackie and Chaiken 
1992) or by triggering an elaboration of the message and serving as an argument (Haugtvedt 
and Rucker 2007). Cues that can be used by both central and peripheral routes in dual process 
models (i.e. they fulfill multiple roles) include message speed (Moore, Hausknecht, and 
Thamodaran 1986), affect (Petty, Cacioppo, and Kasmer 1988), trustworthiness of the source 
(Kang and Herr 2006), or the interactivity of a website (Liu and Shrum 2009). 
3.2 The Heuristic-Systematic Model (HSM) and the Interaction between Dual Processes 
The ELM assumes that consumers process persuasion information using either a 
central or a peripheral route. This suggests that consumers would, for instance, look at either 
a product’s brand (peripheral route) or its technical characteristics (central route), when 
processing a commercial, and then base their decision on one of these two elements. 
Nevertheless, a consumer could be interested in first evaluating a product’s characteristics—
in order to decide if it meets target specifications—and then look at the brand, in order to 
infer quality. In other words, customers may be simultaneously persuaded through central and 
peripheral cues. 
The HSM was the first model to suggest an interaction between the two routes to 
persuasion by allowing a simultaneous effect of heuristic and systematic processes in the 
persuasion process (Petty, Wegener, and Fabrigar 1997). As such, it corresponds to what 
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Evans (2007, 2008) describes as a parallel-competitive duality model. While this notably 
different to the ELM, considerably fewer studies have used the HSM framework than the 
ELM (see footnote 2). This can be explained by the fact that most studies have tested the 
propensity of consumers to use one route instead of the other, rather than understanding the 
consequences of using simultaneous routes. Nonetheless, research using HSM as a 
framework has revealed interesting findings. For instance, Meyers-Levy, and Maheswaran 
(2004) examined the effect of message framing on persuasion when either a heuristic or 
systematic information processing strategy is used, or when both types of information 
processing strategies are employed. Their results showed that allowing for both routes to be 
used simultaneously offered a better fit to the data. Another HSM approach to understanding 
persuasion and consumers’ reactions to deceptive advertising showed that consumers are 
more likely to use negative stereotypes as a heuristic processing of messages when they have 
faced previous deception with a brand (Darke and Ritchie 2007). 
Heuristic and systematic processes can interact in sequence, when for instance 
individuals realize they might have made an incorrect judgment (Martin and Achee 1992). 
Systematic thought can also be a moderator of heuristic processing effects in persuasion 
(Ratneshwar and Chaiken 1991). An individual suddenly paying attention to the quality of 
arguments in an advertisement might start discounting the role of design in forming an 
impression about the quality of a product. Both processes may also interfere with other 
information-processing mechanisms. For example, counter-factual thinking can play a role in 
how individuals use systematic processing when dealing with persuasion messages 
(Krishnamurthy and Sivaraman 2002). In addition, the accessibility of one’s attitudes or 
emotions (Fazio and Williams 1986; Petty, Schumann, Richman, and Strathman 1993) can 
bias information processing and lead to distorted attitudes, as discussed previously. 
3.3. Current Directions: Advances in Measurement 
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Over the last decade, research on persuasion and attitude change in consumer 
psychology has been influenced by advances in attitude measurement methods (Haugtvedt 
and Kasmer 2008). The recurring debate surrounding the use of explicit (Krosnick, Judd, and 
Wittenbrink 2005) and implicit measures of attitudes (Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwartz 
1998) has implications for understanding the relation between the two processes. Explicit 
attitudes are self-reported and measured by using standardized scales—usually Likert scales. 
Implicit attitudes refer to attitudes that are held by consumers prior to any form of mental 
correction, which could otherwise be due to factors such as social desirability concerns, 
majority influence, or cognitive dissonance. Typically, implicit attitude tests (IATs, 
Greenwald et al. 1998) work by measuring consumers’ response times in word associations 
tasks and comparing the time it takes the respondents to make a stereotypical association (e.g. 
Mercedes and ‘good quality’) with a counter-stereotypical association (e.g. Mercedes and 
‘poor quality’). 
Following the introduction of a distinction between explicit and implicit attitudes, 
dual models of attitudes appeared, suggesting that individuals can hold an implicit attitude 
that differs from an explicit one on the same attitude object (Wilson, Lindsey and Schooler 
2000). Wilson and colleagues (2000) further suggested that implicit attitudes are relatively 
stable and difficult to replace, whereas explicit attitudes are more subject to change. This led 
Gawronski and Bodenhausen (2006, 2011) to propose an Associative Propositional 
Evaluation Model and argue that implicit attitudes could be the results of associative 
processes, subject to mere activation, and explicit attitudes could be the results of 
propositional processes, concerned with the validation of beliefs and evaluations. While this 
model is a useful conceptual attempt to address contradictions observed between implicit and 
explicit attitudes, it has not, to our knowledge, found its way into empirical testing in 
consumer research. 
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4. Dual Systems in Judgment and Decision Making 
Humans inherently have a limited capacity for controlled, deliberate or systematic 
thinking. This has been referred to as ‘bounded rationality’, restrictions in the processing of 
information to arrive at decisions due to limits in knowledge (information), available time, 
and computational capacities (Simon 1982; Gigerenzer and Goldstein 1996; Kahneman 
2003). Bounded rationality is reflected in different theoretical approaches to judgment and 
decision making. In the ‘fast and frugal’ approach, the application of heuristics like 
recognition has been described as a rational (S2) strategy (Gigerenzer and Goldstein 1996; 
Goldstein and Gigerenzer 2002). In the ‘heuristics and biases’ view, on the other hand, 
heuristics represent intuitive (S1) thinking that often violates normatively correct (S2) 
judgments (Gilovich, Griffin, and Kahneman 2002; Kahneman and Frederick 2002; Tversky 
and Kahneman 1974). 
Work on heuristics and biases has inspired researchers in the area of consumer 
decision making3. In this section, we first focus on general purpose heuristics used in 
consumer research, specifically availability, representativeness, and anchoring (Tversky and 
Kahneman 1974), which did not adopt a duality of mind perspective. We then introduce 
Kahneman and Frederick’s (2002) Intuitive vs. Reflective systems, a theoretical model for 
general purpose heuristics that was proposed in retrospect of the heuristics and biases 
program. Finally, we discuss the ratio bias (Kirkpatrick and Epstein 1992) and affect 
heuristic, which reflect the distinction between experiential and analytic systems (Slovic et al. 
2002; see also Epstein 1994). 
4.1 Heuristics and Biases: Availability, Representativeness, and Anchoring  
According to Tversky and Kahneman (Kahneman and Tversky 1972; Tversky and 
Kahneman 1974; Tversky and Kahneman 1981; see also Griffin, Gonzalez and Varey 2001), 
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the application of heuristics under conditions of uncertainty can lead to systematic biases as a 
result of intuitive judgments. Availability and representativeness heuristics are processes 
whereby a difficult question is substituted by a simpler one (Kahneman and Frederick 2002; 
Shah and Oppenheimer 2008). Inferences relying on the representativeness heuristic occur 
when probabilities or frequencies are evaluated based on the similarity of a target object with 
a comparison object, often ignoring prior probabilities or base rates. The availability heuristic 
is at work when inferences about the probability of an event or the frequency of a class are 
based on how easily an instance can be brought to mind. Finally, anchoring is a process 
whereby an initial, often implicit, value serves as a reference point against which subsequent 
estimates are made. 
Availability has been studied in relation to the perceived risk of product failure 
(Folkes 1988). In a correlational study, the ease of past service failure recall (receiving the 
wrong order at a fast food restaurant) was associated with judgment about the probability of 
future service failure, but not success. In a separate experiment, hypothetical scenarios about 
rust removal products involving distinctive (e.g. “F.P.V.T.”) brand names led to higher 
estimates of product failure than in a condition where failing products had typical names (e.g. 
“Staino”). The availability heuristic has also been shown to be at work when consumers 
judge retailers’ price levels based on their relative ease in recalling low-priced products (Ofir, 
Raghubir, Brosh, Monroe, and Heiman 2008). Other consumer judgments that have been 
associated with availability include “ease of retrieval”, when the ease of recalling positive 
product features leads to more favorable product evaluations, independent of actual 
information available (Menon and Raghubir 2003). 
Expected product performance can be subject to representativeness-based inferences. 
In terms of price cognition (e.g. Thomas and Morwitz 2009), it has been suggested that the 
representativeness heuristic is evident in the perception of an offered price as relatively lower 
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when it is presented in smaller font (the size congruity effect; Coulter and Coulter 2005). In 
the perception of packaging, a consumer may notice a similarity in packaging between a 
generic target product and a familiar brand, inferring that product performance will be 
comparable (Kardes, Posavac, and Cronley 2004). When base rates available to customers 
(e.g. based on actual or experienced performance of generic products) conflict with the 
apparent similarity between exemplar and target objects, inferior judgments tend to occur. 
Anchoring effects among consumers have been found in relation to purchase 
quantities. Anchors, in the form of multiple-unit prices (e.g. “4 cans for $2”), purchase 
quantity limits (e.g. “limit of 12 per person”), selling slogans (e.g. “Buy 18 Snickers bars for 
your freezer”), and even ‘expansion anchors’ like “101 uses!” can increase sales by making a 
higher than normal purchase quantity more salient (Wansink, Kent, and Hoch 1998). The 
number of product units shown on a package can also bias consumer perceptions, where a 
display of greater quantities leads not only to perceptions of greater product quantity, but also 
to greater actual product consumption (Madzharov and Block 2010). Anchoring is also 
associated with the integration of other types of numerical information, such as reference 
pricing. These anchoring effects occur when price claims are easily accessible (Yadav and 
Seiders 1998), which can affect product evaluations (Elaad, Sayag, and Ezer 2010). 
Studies on availability and anchoring effects among consumers have investigated 
interactions between heuristic reasoning (S1) and knowledge or expertise, a variable 
commonly associated with S2 thinking. Consumer knowledgeability affects price estimations 
(Ofir et al. 2008, Yadav and Seiders 1998) and judgments about expected returns on 
investment (Jordan and Kaas 2002). For example, less knowledgeable consumers have been 
found to be more susceptible to anchoring bias when judging the expected annual return of 
two investments (Jordan and Kaas 2002). While these consumer researchers have not looked 
at general purpose heuristics from a dual systems or process point of view, Kahneman and 
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Frederick (2002) have proposed a dual systems framework to explain past work in the 
heuristics and biases domain, which is outlined in the next section. 
4.2 The Intuitive vs. Reflective Model 
There was no explicit discussion of dual processes in Kahneman’s early work with 
Tversky in the heuristics and biases program. Similarly, associated consumer research 
reviewed in the previous section has been interested in the effects of variables like knowledge 
and expertise, but has not explicitly tested dual process hypotheses by systematically varying 
conditions under which judgments are made. Kahneman and Frederick (2002) discussed, for 
the first time, the heuristics and biases program in relation to intuitive and reflective thinking 
systems. The former system automatically offers intuitive answers to problems, while the 
latter has a supervisory function by monitoring S1 default proposals. Although there is a 
certain level of competition between S1 and S2 processes, S2 often quite readily approves 
intuitive judgments. Even when deliberate judgments override intuitive responses, these are 
likely to remain anchored on the impressions initially generated by S1. Evans (2007, 2008) 
refers to this view on dual processing as default-interventionist due to the primacy of 
preconscious S1 processes that shape deliberative S2 thought. 
A number of studies, mainly in cognitive psychology, have identified variables 
affecting intuitive vs. reflective thinking, especially ease of retrieval and base-rate neglect 
(see also Kahneman and Frederick 2002; Kahneman 2011 for summaries). Greater reflective 
dominance has been found as a result of not only acquired knowledge or expertise, as 
discussed previously, but also formal training (Agnoli 1991; Nisbett, Krantz, Jepson, and 
Kunda 1983), as well as dispositions like general intelligence (e.g. Barbey and Sloman 2007) 
and critical thinking ability (West, Toplak, and Stanovich 2008). Research specifically 
looking at anchoring and adjustment has found that anchoring cues were more influential on 
individuals high in openness-to-experience (McElroy and Dowd 2007). 
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Further support for two different processes is provided by situational manipulations. 
Instructing participants to think like statisticians (Schwarz, Strack, Hilton, and Naderer 1991) 
and the priming of a formal thought mindset (Ferreira et al. 2006) have been associated with 
greater reliance on S2. Increased cognitive load, experimentally induced by reducing 
processing resources (Chun and Kruglanski 2006; Ferreira et al. 2006; Greifeneder and Bless 
2007), and time pressure (Betsch, Plessner, Schwieren, and Gütig 2001) favor S1 use. While 
positive mood appears to lead to a greater intuitive dominance, negative mood seems to foster 
reflective processing (Bless 2001; cf. Isen, Nygren, and Ashby 1988; for a review see 
Schwarz 2002; Kahneman 2011). 
4.3 From Ratio Bias to the Affect Heuristic: The Experiential vs. Analytic Model 
While S1 processes in the intuitive-reflective distinction are mainly about easily 
accessible information in memory, another dual system perspective on judgment and decision 
making has proposed an experiential S1, marked by automatically generated feelings, as 
evident in the ratio bias and affect heuristic. 
The concept of ratio bias (Kirkpatrick and Epstein 1992) is rooted in our difficulties in 
dealing with proportions or ratios as opposed to absolute numbers. For example, when asked 
to evaluate two movie rental plans with a contracted scale (e.g. 7 and 9 new movies per week 
for Plans A and B, respectively) as opposed to an equivalent offering with an expanded scale 
(364 and 468 movies per year, respectively), consumers favor the better plan (Plan B) more 
in the scale expansion than contraction condition (Burson, Larrick, and Lynch 2009; Study 
1). According to Epstein’s (1994) cognitive-experiential self theory (CEST), this occurs 
because the experiential system—unlike the rational system—encodes information as 
concrete representations, and absolute numbers are more concrete than ratios or percentages. 
When making choices in experiments, participants often experience conflicts between 
“knowing” and “feeling” (Denes-Raj and Epstein 1994), reporting that “they had two 
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opposite views… one based on their knowledge that the [two proportions] were equal and the 
other based on their strong intuitive impression that they were not” (Kirkpatrick and Epstein 
1992, p. 544). Evans (2007, 2008) classifies the CEST as an example of parallel-competitive 
duality structure. 
Impressions generated by the experiential system are often strongly linked to affect. 
The affect heuristic (Slovic et al. 2002, 2004; cf. Zajonc 1980, 1997) has been considered 
another general purpose heuristic (Kahneman and Frederick 2002) and represents a reliance 
on good or bad feelings experienced in relation to a stimulus. Affect-based judgments occur 
quickly, automatically, and prior to S2 judgments. Similar to availability and 
representativeness, affect serves as an orienting mechanism—a cue in judgments akin to 
memorability, imaginability, and similarity (Slovic, Peters, Finucane, and MacGregor 2005). 
Slovic and colleagues (2002, 2004, 2005) adapted Epstein’s (1994) distinction 
between experiential and analytic (“rational”) modes of thinking. Consumer reliance on the 
experiential system (affect heuristic) as opposed to analytic thought is most apparent when 
they are cognitively busy or under time pressure. One notable experiment (Finucane, 
Alhakami, Slovic, and Johnson 2000) asked participants to rate the risks and benefits of 
various technologies (e.g. cellular phones) in time pressure and no-time-pressure conditions. 
When the participants had to respond within five seconds, correlations across participants 
between judgments of risks and judgments of benefits were much more strongly negative. 
According to the authors, the affect heuristic is a more efficient way of processing 
information under conditions of limited cognitive resources, where positive affect (i.e. liking 
a product) leads to a perception of low risks and high benefits, while negative affect 
(disliking) results in an assessment of high risks and low benefits. 
The affect heuristic has been used as a possible explanation for a range of product 
judgments, including differences in product attribute recall (Yeung and Wyer 2004), 
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emotional framing in the media (Sinaceur, Heath, and Cole 2005), option framing effects 
(Biswas 20094), product “valuation by feeling” (Hsee and Rottenstreich 2004), and zero-price 
effects (Shampanier, Mazar, and Ariely 2007). 
4.4 Current Directions: Default-Interventionist vs. Parallel-Competitive Theories 
A small body of research has emerged in response to default-interventionist (Evans 
2007, 2008) conceptions of dual processing in heuristics and biases. Results thus far appear to 
support more closely a parallel process view of the parallel-competitive model (but see 
Gillard, Van Dooren, Schaeken, and Verschaffel 2009 for evidence to the contrary). 
Evans (2007) suggests that the speed and automaticity of S1 processes is one of the 
reasons why they are considered to be a default response in the default-interventionist view. 
However, from a parallel-competitive perspective, fast S1 processes would normally wait for 
the slow S2 processes to be finished before making a decision. S1 processes would then 
dominate decision making, but only when there is limited time or cognitive capacity. Ferreira 
and collaborators (2006) challenged the assumption of zero-sum relations between the S1 and 
S2 processes (as correct responses increase, incorrect responses decrease) of a default-
interventionist perspective by applying a Process Dissociation Procedure (PDP)5. Their 
experiments used cognitive load, processing goals, priming, and formal training 
manipulations and investigated their effects on base-rate, conjunction, and ratio-bias 
problems. As expected by the researchers, manipulations affected processes independently. 
Instructions to think like scientists affected S2 estimates, while cognitive load decreased S2 
judgments. A heuristic prime, on the other hand, increased S1 effects, while formal training 
affected the subsequent use of S2. The near zero correlation between S1 and S2 estimates 
provided further evidence for the authors to conclude that there is functional independence 
between the two processes.  
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With respect to the competitive aspects of the parallel-competitive model, De Neys 
and Glumicic (2008) pitted the default-interventionist assumption of lax S2 monitoring 
against that of flawless S2 monitoring and S1-S2 conflict, as suggested by a parallel 
competitive view. Participants had to solve a base-rate neglect problem while thinking aloud. 
The results showed that giving heuristic responses was less likely to be due to insufficient 
conflict detection, as implied by the default-interventionist view, but rather a failure to 
resolve the conflict after its detection. The authors suggest that a shallow analytic monitoring 
process may be at work, where both processes operate simultaneously, but S2 thinking is not 
full-fletched analytic thinking. Subsequent research by Bonner and Newell (2010; see also 
Denes-Raj and Epstein 1994) using a ratio bias task came to similar conclusions. 
 
5. Dual Systems in Buying and Consumption Behavior 
Psychologists have long been interested in the tension between human impulse and 
self-control, beginning with Sigmund Freud’s (1961/1989) notion of the struggles between 
the id, the seat of drives or impulses, vs. the super-ego, an internalization of culturally 
derived authority. Strack and colleagues (2006; see also Strack and Deutsch 2004) proposed a 
comprehensive Reflective-Intuitive Model (RIM) dual system model of consumer behavior 
that integrates a number of theoretical antecedents, mainly from social psychology. 
We first discuss the RIM’s theoretical building blocks that link stimuli, affective and 
conceptual content, and behavioral outcomes. Specifically, we introduce research on priming 
and automatic goal pursuit, suggesting a connection between conceptual content and 
behavioral schemata (Bargh 2002). We then describe the link between perception and 
behavior through the S1 concept of approach avoidance (Staats 1996), relating impulsiveness 
to the approach of positively valenced stimuli. Moreover, we introduce the S2 ideas of 
delayed gratification (Mischel 1974) and self-regulation (Vohs and Baumeister 2004) and 
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show how the Hot/Cool model integrates the dynamics between S1 affective impulse and S2 
willpower or self-control (Metcalfe and Mischel 1999). Finally, we discuss the Reflective-
Impulsive (RIM) model in more detail, which represents the integration of these ideas into a 
larger framework. 
5.1 Priming and Automatic Goal Pursuit: A Link between Conceptual Content and 
Behavior  
Much of the foundation of the RIM can be found in theories on social cognition. 
Researchers in this area have approached consumer decision making as a result of 
environmental cues that often affect behavior non-consciously, without relying on the 
traditional information processing model that has informed the ELM and HSM6. In social 
cognition, priming refers to a non-conscious process in which existing memories are 
activated as a result of perceiving a stimulus, which can affect subsequent perceptions, 
thoughts (in the form of both attitudes and goals), and actions (e.g. Bargh, Chen, and Burrows 
1996; Dijksterhuis, Smith, van Baaren, and Wigboldus 2005; Higgins 1996). Physical or 
social cues in the environment non-consciously influence choices and may even bypass 
attitudes altogether by directly activating goals or behaviors (Dijksterhuis et al. 2005; 
Chartrand and Bargh 1999).  
Both subliminal primes, where people are not aware of the prime, and supraliminal 
primes, where people are aware of the prime but not its influence, can affect behaviors 
(Bargh 2002). A well-known field experiment using a supraliminal prime exposed shoppers 
to either stereotypically German or French music in a retail environment (North, Hargreaves 
and McKendrick 1999). Hearing French music led to significantly greater French wine 
purchases, while the same relationship was found for German music and wines. Customers 
reported no awareness of the effect that music had on their choices. Goal-directed behavior 
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like buying can thus be the result of a link between conceptual content and behavioral 
schemata (Strack et al. 2006) without consumer awareness (Chartrand 2005). 
5.2 Approach-Avoidance, Delay of Gratification, and Self-Regulation 
At the center of the choice environment encountered by consumers are objects of 
consumption, which can elicit a conditioned emotional response. According to Staats’ (1996) 
psychological behaviorist learning theory, such stimuli have three functions. First, they elicit 
an emotional response. Second, the stimuli can act as behavioral reinforcers. Third, they are 
directive (incentive) stimuli, leading to approach behavior in the positive and avoidance 
behavior in the negative case. Impulse buying can be the result of a direct link between a 
positive valence of the stimulus and motor response (e.g. reaching for a product in the 
supermarket) or verbal response. 
Impulse buying is a spontaneous behavior that reflects immediate gratification 
occurring as a result of an urge to buy (Strack et al. 2006). The power of impulsivity is 
evident in experiments investigating immediate gratification, which suggest that drawing 
attention away from the tempting qualities of stimuli can enhance a delay in gratification (e.g. 
Mischel and Baker 1975; Mischel, Shoda, and Rodriguez 1989). Cognitions with the 
potential to act as sources of self-control are the hallmark of S2 processes, the dominance of 
which increases with maturation.  
The study of self-regulation posits that cognitive resources are limited and can 
become depleted temporarily as a result of situational self-control demands (Baumeister, 
Sparks, Stillman, and Vohs 2008; Faber and Vohs 2004; Vohs and Faber 2007). In the 
laboratory, ego depletion has been manipulated in different ways, ranging from arithmetic 
problem-solving to suppressing emotional responses to a film. Ego depletion has been shown 
to affect the choice of unhealthy over healthy food, trashy over highbrow entertainment, 
greater food intake among dieters, and an increase in spending, as indicated by the price 
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people are willing to pay for a particular consumer good (see Baumeister et al. 2008 for a 
summary). 
5.3. The Hot/Cool Model and the Dynamics of Willpower 
The tension between impulse and reflective knowledge is evident in Metcalfe and 
Mischel’s (1999) Hot/Cool dual system framework, where the dynamics of willpower are 
played out between a cool, cognitive “know” and a hot, emotional “go” system. The hot 
system is reflexive, impulsive, and controlled by the stimulus, which is often characterized by 
conditioned responding, while the cool system is slow, episodic, and strategic. With respect 
to the delay of gratification, a yielding to temptation by the hot system is the default. Akin to 
Evans’ (2007, 2008) default-interventionist type of dual processing, the default state of the 
system is set to hot: Individuals succumb to temptation unless external or internal (S2) 
control strategies are applied. External control strategies include obscuring the stimulus, 
presenting physical distractions, or re-framing the stimulus in a cool rather than a hot way; 
internal strategies include an avoidance of paying attention to the stimulus, changing its 
salience by producing self-generated cognitive distractions, or thinking about the cool 
properties of the object. 
According to Hofmann, Friese, and Strack (2009), a hot and cool systems perspective 
holds that impulses are strong and “primitive hedonic reactions” to tempting stimuli (p. 163). 
The dynamic framework acknowledges that self-control is a demanding effort requiring 
attention, self-discipline, and willpower, while impulses emerge when perceptual or imagined 
stimuli activate associative memory clusters. A self-control dilemma emerges if the two 
systems produce incompatible behavioral implications—a tension between temptation and 
motivation for restraint. The Reflective-Impulsive Model (RIM; Strack et al. 2006), discussed 
in the next section, integrates hot-cool tensions in a larger theoretical framework. 
5.4 The Reflective-Impulsive Model (RIM) 
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The Reflective-Impulsive Model (RIM) of consumer behavior, proposed by Strack et 
al. (2006), is congruent with research in the area of automatic goal pursuit, reviewed earlier, 
by suggesting that stimuli, conceptual content, and behavioral schemata are connected. It also 
accounts for the link between affective reactions evoked by objects and ensuing motor 
responses, as proposed by approach-avoidance theories and outlined in the hot/cool dual 
system model. Finally, it acknowledges the competing forces of impulse and willpower 
suggested by self-regulation theory. 
Unlike other dual system frameworks, the RIM suggests that behavioral processes are 
integrated into affective and cognitive structures, behavioral schemata that “connect 
frequently co-occurring motor representations with their antecedent conditions and their 
consequences” (Strack et al. 2006, p. 208). In the impulsive system, the simplest source of 
behavioral activation is perceptual input (e.g. seeing a chocolate bar), which not only evokes 
conceptual and affective content (e.g. anticipatory pleasure of a chocolaty taste), but also 
activates behavioral schemata (e.g. related to grabbing or eating the treat). In the associative 
network of the impulsive system, the close spatial or temporal proximity of a stimulus will 
strengthen links in this network.  
In the rule-based, flexible, and slowly operating reflective system outlined by Strack 
and colleagues, the desirability and feasibility of a behavior are evaluated (e.g. based on 
knowledge that the candy bar’s price has been reduced, or that it’s unhealthy). This system 
has a regulatory function that relies on planning and putting intention into action. As it is 
more easily disrupted by other processes, its operation is subject to the availability of 
cognitive resources. For instance, Shiv and Fedorikhin (1999; Study 1) found that consumers 
were more likely to choose chocolate cake over fruit salad when cognitive processing 
resources were limited. When processing resources were unrestricted, consumers were more 
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likely to choose fruit salad. This effect was absent when the stimuli consisted of photographs 
rather than the real items. 
In the RIM (Strack et al. 2006), the reflective system is more influential when the 
target is important (e.g. buying a car rather than toothpaste) or when the consumer expects to 
be held accountable for his/her decision. The impulsive system, on the other hand, can be 
more dominant, not only if cognitive resources are limited or depleted, or when the consumer 
is in a positive mood, but also if buying decisions are facilitated by habitual schemata or the 
consumer is in a state of need deprivation (e.g. craving, hunger). 
According to Strack and colleagues, impulse and reflection may compete if activated 
schemata are not compatible. However, impulsive and reflective processes often operate in 
parallel and jointly influence behavior. Thus, the RIM is an approach to dual processing that 
resembles a parallel-competitive form (Evans 2007, 2008). For example, the decision process 
for a house purchase may include an evaluation of functional costs and benefits, but also 
feelings about architectural design. Moreover, the two systems may influence each other. The 
impulsive system affects reflection through priming processes, discussed earlier, or visceral 
states, such as hunger or thirst (e.g. Aarts, Dijksterhuis, and De Vries 2001). Conversely, the 
reflective system can influence impulse through the process of intending and the regulation of 
perceptual input or cognition, as proposed by the Hot/Cool model (Metcalfe and Mischel 
1999). This is particularly relevant if the consumer is conscious of the link between 
environmental cues and behavioral outcomes, even though the intervening process usually 
remains unconscious (Chartrand 2005). 
5.5 Current Directions: Predicting Impulsive Consumer Behavior 
Impulsiveness is about an inability to forgo immediate benefits (e.g. owning a new 
TV set now) in favor of future payoffs (e.g. waiting for the post-holiday sales). Behavioral 
economic theories have studied impulsiveness from the perspective of present bias and a 
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discounting of the future, which has informed a dual self theory of impulsiveness (Fudenberg 
and Levine 2006). Establishing a connection and interaction between present and future self 
by means of age-progressed photographs can increase people’s likelihood to accept delayed 
monetary rewards over immediate rewards (Hershfield, Goldstein, Sharpe, Fox, 
Yeykelis,Carstensen, and Bailenson 2011). 
Past research suggests that normative and dispositional variables can predict 
consumer impulsiveness (Rook and Fisher 1995). Nenkov, Inman, and Hulland (2008) 
developed an elaboration on potential outcomes (EPO) scale and show that consumers with 
high EPO levels self-regulate more effectively with respect to choices in the domains of 
health and money management. From a dual processing perspective, Hofmann et al. (2009) 
expanded the RIM by outlining a framework for the prediction of self-control outcomes 
based on impulsive and reflective antecedents, as well as dispositional and situational 
boundary conditions.  
An experiment conducted by Hofmann and colleagues (2009), using an emotion 
suppression task to induce a depletion of self-regulatory resources, shows that candy 
consumption can be better predicted by automatic affective reactions (implicit attitudes) 
among participants in a depletion but not control condition. Candy consumption was more 
strongly regulated according to participants’ dietary restraint standards (based on explicit 
self-reports) in a non-depletion condition (for further evidence see Friese, Hofmann, and 
Wänke 2008, Studies 2 & 3). Similar evidence has been produced using cognitive load 
(Friese et al. 2008, Study 1) and alcohol intoxication (Hofmann and Friese 2008) 
manipulations. As dispositional moderators of consumption behavior, studies have also found 
an effect of working memory capacity (Oberauer, Suess, Schulze, Wilhelm, and Wittmann 
2000) and trait self-control (Tangney, Baumeister, and Boone 2004) on consumption 
behavior, ranging from sexually tempting images to eating behaviors, where automatic 
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attitudes toward tempting stimuli had a stronger effect on behavior for low rather than high 
working memory capacity (Hofmann, Gschwendner, Friese, Wiers, and Schmitt 2008, Study 
1) and trait self-control individuals (Friese and Hofmann 2009). 
 
6. Discussion 
We have offered a structured review of three different strands of research on dual 
systems and dual process models in psychology, which can account for different stages of the 
consumer decision making process, namely persuasion and attitude change, judgment and 
decision making, and buying and consumption behavior. Duality models hold that S1 
processes are automatic, fast, and experience-based, whereas processes in S2 are deliberate, 
slow, and reflective. This dualism, however, has been questioned (e.g. Keren and Schul 2009) 
and alternative models have been proposed, particularly in the domain of social inference 
(Kruglanski and Orehek 2007). Proposed alternatives to the ‘dual minds’ view have ranged 
from simplified uni-process models (Kruglanski, Erb, Pierro, Mannetti, and Chun 2006) to 
more nuanced quad models (Sherman 2006). In the persuasion and attitude change area, an 
experiential route has been suggested, in which emotions triggered by a message can be used 
to determine whether and how different cues are processed (Meyers-Levy and Malaviya 
1999). Fishbein and Middlestadt (1995, 1997) argued in favor of uni-dimensional models of 
attitude change. They proposed that most non-belief changes in attitudes, i.e. changes that did 
not appear to be directly related to the conscious process of a change of beliefs about an 
attitude object, could in fact be accounted for by traditional expectancy value models of 
attitudes, which suggest that consumers develop attitudes as a function of their beliefs about 
attitude objects (e.g. this TV has a good quality image) and the value that they attribute to 
these beliefs (e.g. a good quality image is an important TV attribute). 
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Advocates of a two-system view of the mind have emphasized its usefulness as an 
explanatory framework with substantial empirical support that can account for research 
findings across different strands of psychology (Deutsch and Strack 2006; Evans 2008; 
Kahneman 2011). At worst, the duality of mind view is a helpful conceptual model or 
“psychodrama with two characters”, as described by Daniel Kahneman in Thinking, Fast and 
Slow (2011, p. 21). We can expect duality of mind research to benefit from advances in 
neuroscience, which offers supporting evidence for a dissociation of S1 and S2, particularly 
processes that approximate automatic and controlled processing in decision making (Monsell 
and Driver 2000; Sanfey and Chang 2008). 
We now turn to a summary of the core ideas of each duality strand, after which we 
will compare and contrast the models and strands by looking at the way dual systems and 
processes have been conceptualized, interactions between these systems or processes, and 
their conditions and moderators. Finally, we show how duality models can be related to 
implicit and explicit attitudes. 
6.1 Summary of the Three Strands 
In the area of persuasion and attitude change, dual processes refer to the way 
consumers process persuasion material either extensively or non-extensively. Consumers’ 
motivation to engage with persuasion material and to form and hold correct attitudes are key 
determinants of the use of either route. Two key models emerged, with the ELM model 
suggesting the use of only one route (either central or peripheral) to persuasion, and the HSM 
model allowing for the possibility of a simultaneous use of both the systematic (central) and 
heuristic (peripheral) routes to persuasion. Information typically relied upon in central or 
systematic processing includes argument-quality related indicators. For example, a consumer 
may look at the technical characteristics of TV sets presented to her and process this 
information extensively in order to determine if a TV set matches target characteristics. 
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Peripheral or heuristic processing tends to rely on cues like emotions linked to the persuasion 
message, the perceived credibility or attractiveness of the message source, and the design and 
aesthetics of the advertisement (e.g. being drawn to the nice living room and gender of the 
actor in a TV advertisement).  
In the judgment and decision making literature, S1 is home to general purpose 
(domain-independent) heuristics characterized by the accessibility of information (Intuitive 
vs. Reflective Model) and affective responses (Experiential vs. Analytic Model). The former 
model has largely served as a framework to explain findings on heuristics and biases that 
precede most dual system theories. Consumer researchers—primarily in marketing—have 
focused on general purpose heuristics applied to judgments about goods and services, 
including brand, packaging, product risk, and price perceptions. Consumers can attempt to 
analyze costs and benefits by relying on existing knowledge (reflected in consumer expertise) 
and available information, as exemplified by online tools that allow for a side-by-side 
comparison of televisions. At the same time, consumers are also likely to take shortcuts that 
rely on easily accessible memories and gut-feelings. For instance, affect towards a television 
brand, as well as price anchors or anecdotal evidence about brand performance, may 
influence judgments when alternatives are evaluated. 
In the area of buying and consumption behavior, the RIM model represents the 
integration of existing theories around automatic goal pursuit, self-control, approach-
avoidance, and associated Hot/Cool systems framework. In the impulsive system, consumers’ 
perception of a stimulus becomes linked to affective and conceptual content that activates 
goals and behavioral schemata, ultimately influencing purchasing or consumption behaviors. 
For example, when browsing TV sets in-store, customers may imagine themselves in actual 
usage contexts, leading to an approach response. Prior knowledge and intentions provide the 
basis for regulatory S2 processes, which are dominant in the planning of behavior and the 
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overcoming of habitual action. Similar to the concept of relevance and involvement in dual 
process theories of persuasion, S2 processes are strengthened if the purchase is important or 
the consumer is held accountable for his actions. As shown across duality models, a reduction 
in cognitive resources and positive mood can increase the dominance of S1. Similarly, need 
deprivation and habitual mechanisms (e.g. tending to browse through technology sections at 
department stores) also strengthen impulsive processes. 
6.2. Towards an Integration of Duality Theories in Consumer Psychology 
We now turn to comparing and contrasting the different strands. More specifically, we 
focus on the nature of dual processes and systems over the three strands, their interaction as 
well as conditions, and moderating variables that have been found to favor one process over 
the other. Finally, we show how the connection between the different strands can be further 
enhanced by looking at how dual processes and systems connect with implicit and explicit 
attitudes across the duality models. Table 1 includes a summary of the dimensions used to 
compare and contrast the different strands. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
6.2.1 Nature and Origins of the Two Systems 
System 1. The conceptualization of S1 varies across the persuasion and attitude 
change, judgment and decision making, and buying and consumption strands. The heuristics 
and biases tradition (Intuitive vs. Reflective model) adopted a perceptual analogy to explain 
intuitive judgments: “Illusions” in both perception and judgment occur when some attributes 
of objects are more accessible than others (Kahneman 2003). S1 is a combination of 
automatic and parallel operations evident in perception and the conceptual content that enters 
the reflective S2 (Kahneman and Frederick 2002). In the Experiential vs. Analytic distinction 
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(Slovic et al. 2002), S1 is characterized by affect. Regarding the origin of the two processes, 
both approaches within this strand theorize an evolutionarily old S1, marked by automatically 
and easily retrieved content (either information or affect) that may serve as a substitute for 
more complex processing. In the persuasion literature, by contrast, peripheral or heuristic 
processes have been related to an associative memory system (S1) (Smith and DeCoster 
2000). They are often evident in automatic social cognition based on salient cues, such as the 
likability, expertise, or attractiveness of the communicator (HSM: Chaiken 1980; ELM: Petty 
and Cacioppo 1986). 
S1 in models explaining impulsive and reflective processes is firmly rooted in the 
concept of approaching positively valenced stimuli and the avoidance of negatively valenced 
stimuli. These can be either perceived or imagined. The Experiential vs. Analytic model in 
judgment, built around the affect heuristic, shares this focus on automatically generated 
emotional associations, which can be acquired through experience or learning. Indeed, Shiv 
and Fedorikhin’s (1999) study on the choice of chocolate cake vs. fruit salad under limited 
processing resources, discussed previously, exemplifies this connection and has been cited in 
both the affect heuristic (Slovic et al. 2005) and RIM literature (Strack et al. 2006). 
The persuasion and attitude change as well as judgment and decision making strands 
overlap with respect to the concept of heuristics in S1 processing. Scholars working with 
persuasion models applied to consumer attitudes, however, have focused on the development 
of domain-specific heuristics, while the heuristics in the judgment and decision making 
strand discussed in this review (i.e. availability, representativeness, anchoring and affect) are 
domain-general in nature. Examples of marketing heuristics rooted in the persuasion (HSM) 
literature include the brand name heuristic (Maheswaran et al. 1992), the price heuristic 
(Mitra 1995), and the scarcity heuristic (Brannon and Brock 2001). Shah and Oppenheimer 
(2008) argue that many persuasion and marketing heuristics rely on a range of cues indicating 
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positive or negative associations to be used in evaluating items. However, “these heuristics 
are implicitly defined as cues that are used when they are present, rather than processes that 
reduce effort by using certain cues” (p. 209; emphasis added). General purpose heuristics, on 
the other hand, not only rely on easily retrievable mental content, but also tend to examine 
fewer cues and integrate less information (Shah and Oppenheimer 2008). Indeed, it has been 
argued that cues in models like the HSM may enter a form of recognition-based decision 
making—essentially low-effort S2 processing (Evans, 2008). However, if the processing of 
heuristic cues is conceptualized in terms of well-learned and automatic associations rather 
than rules, its similarity to S1 processes becomes clearer (Smith and DeCoster 2000).  
System 2. The role of S2 across duality models and strands is to compute, compare, 
plan, and choose (Kahneman 2011), and this system has been conceptualized more 
homogeneously in the literature than S1 (D. Kahneman, personal communication, May 31, 
2012). S2 processes across all strands share an emphasis on a logical evaluation of evidence, 
arguably rooted in an understanding of reflective thought as the evolutionarily younger part 
of the brain and home to general purpose reasoning (cf. the “Standard Social Science Model” 
in Tooby and Cosmides 1992). 
In duality models concerned with either consumer judgment or behavior, an important 
role of S2 is to direct attention. S2 can correct S1 impressions when a consumer reminds 
herself to consider only product features that are relevant (e.g. price and nutritional 
information instead of the resemblance of its packaging to another brand) to the judgment 
task at hand. Similarly, as proposed by the Hot/Cool model of willpower and the RIM, S2 can 
be used to cope with a tempting situation by applying strategies like redirecting attention 
away from a tempting stimulus or producing thoughts that emphasize its cool properties. 
While the S2 emphasis is on computation and comparison in both the persuasion and 
attitude change as well as the judgment and decision making areas, the buying and 
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consumption behavior strand expands S2’s main purpose to planning and choice (Strack et al. 
2006) and the related concept of self-control (Metcalfe and Mischel 1999). More particularly, 
S2 in the RIM is in charge of both intending (by assessing desirability and feasibility) and 
implementing previously formed intentions. Intending represents the bridge between making 
a behavioral decision and actual buying behavior (Strack et al. 2006). 
6.2.2 Interaction between S1 and S2 Processes 
The nature of S1 and S2 interaction differs both within and across duality strands. The 
ELM specifies no interaction between dual processes (i.e. the use of one route or the other), 
while the HSM, Experiential vs. Analytic, and RIM models can be classified as examples of 
parallel-competitive duality structures (Evans 2007, 2008). The Intuitive vs. Reflective and 
Hot/Cool models, by contrast, appear to represent Evans’ default-interventionist operations. 
The HSM allows for parallel and sequential uses of both processes. This means that, 
for example, a consumer might first evaluate a product claim in a marketing message against 
a predetermined standard, and then look at the brand to infer quality heuristically. In the 
judgment and decision making tradition, experiential vs. analytic processes may not only 
interact, but outcomes are subject to a conflict between “knowing” and “feeling” (Denes-Raj 
and Epstein 1994). These tensions are less apparent in the Intuitive vs. Reflective model, 
where S1 proposals occur by default and S2 gains the upper hand only if it both intervenes 
and adjusts initial S1 impressions. (As discussed in Section 4.4.; however, this default-
interventionist view has been challenged by some researchers.) Finally, Strack and colleagues 
(2006) explicitly critique the strict S1 and S2 distinction in the ELM. They argue that even a 
seemingly reflective purchase like a car is likely the result of more than just an evaluation of 
costs and benefits. Feelings elicited by other cues, such as the car’s design and color, may 
also influence a purchase decision. 
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Unlike the Hot/Cool model, where giving in to temptation is the default setting, the 
RIM makes a stronger case for parallel-competitive dual mechanisms in consumer behavior. 
Impulses in the RIM constitute an immediate and direct influence on behavior, which may 
intervene after judgments have been made and intentions formed. In contrast to Intuitive vs. 
Reflective systems, intervention in the RIM may occur through both S1 and S2 at different 
points in time. S1 may affect S2 through activated goals, for example, such as satisfying 
needs like hunger or thirst. (In the case of hunger, lowered blood glucose levels may further 
impair S2’s ability to control attention and impulses [Gailliot and Baumeister 2007].) 
Conversely, S2 may hamper S1 impulses by active regulation (e.g. distraction) strategies, as 
well as making impulsive behavior more likely by merely considering a behavioral option. 
The competitive nature of systems outlined in the RIM is most apparent in the regret-based 
tensions that can form once an impulsive behavior has been performed. Overall, and apart 
from the ELM in the persuasion and attitude change strand, all models suggest some form of 
S1 and S2 interaction, where S2 often acts as a ‘corrector’ of S1 processes. 
6.2.3 Conditions and Moderators of S1 and S2 Processing 
Empirical work across the three strands discussed in this review has identified the 
situational availability of cognitive processing resources (due to time constraints or cognitive 
load) as a condition enabling S2 processing. In addition, positive mood is a facilitator of S1 
processing and negative mood a facilitator of S2 processing.  
Due to their common study of how people evaluate information in the formation of 
either attitudes or judgments, scholars in both the persuasion and judgment and decision 
making strands have been interested in individuals’ ability to process information in an S2 
manner, not only due to the situational ability (e.g. availability of cognitive resources), but 
also acquired expertise or knowledge. Expertise provides consumers with cognitive tools or 
content to process information deliberatively. 
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Traits like self-control or restraint standards are unique moderators of S2 processing 
in research on impulsive vs. reflective behavior. A link between judgment and decision 
making and impulsive vs. reflective behavior may be evident in reasoning ability, as 
measured by the Cognitive Reflection Test (Frederick 2005), which relies on tasks akin to 
those that have been used to demonstrate the default nature of S1 impressions in the Intuitive 
vs. Reflective model (e.g. the famous bat-and-ball problem). CRT scores turn out to be 
significant predictors of present bias in intertemporal choice (e.g. choosing to receive $3,400 
this month rather than $3,800 next month). This relationship demonstrates that S2 reasoning 
ability may be a useful measure of S2 control across duality strands. Put another way, the 
generally “trigger happy” nature of S1 may at least in part account for both intuitive 
judgments and impulsive consumer behavior. 
A focus on consumer motivation—especially with respect to relevance or 
involvement—is an important similarity between the persuasion and attitude change and 
buying behavior strands. Aside from thinking ability and knowledge, motivational factors are 
positively related to S2 processing in persuasion and include variables like personal relevance 
and need for cognition. The RIM also stresses the importance of motivation. While some 
motivationally-rooted variables, such as need deprivation, are unique to a duality view of 
consumer behavior, others favoring S2, most notably product/purchase importance and 
accountability, appear to be equally significant in both strands. 
Another motivational dimension that links duality models related to product 
evaluation with those in the area of purchasing behavior is evident in regulatory focus theory 
(Higgins 1998). According to the theory, people can be promotion or prevention focused. 
Promotion involves the pursuit of goals with an achievement or advancement orientation, 
characterized by an eagerness to get there, while prevention focus entails security and 
protection with a pursuit characterized by vigilance. Research suggests that promotion focus 
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is associated with S1 and prevention focus with S2 at different stages of the consumer 
decision making process (Pham and Higgins 2005), including the evaluation of marketing 
messages (Pham and Avnet 2004), product evaluations (Pham and Avnet 2009), and actual 
consumer choices (Florack, Friese, and Scarabis 2010; Sengupta and Zhou 2007). 
6.2.4. The Duality of Mind and Implicit vs. Explicit Attitudes 
 Given the importance of the concept of attitudes in consumer psychology—illustrated 
by the central role played by variables such as attitudes towards brands and customer 
satisfaction—understanding attitude formation has long been the focus of a great deal of 
consumer research. Over the last decade, the literature on implicit social cognition has 
introduced the idea of a duality of attitude structure. Bargh (2002, see also Greenwald et al. 
2002) suggested the existence of both explicit (i.e. conscious) attitudes and implicit (i.e. non-
conscious) ones. This distinction helps to explain the dissociation between traditional verbal 
measures of attitudes and actual behavior. Duality models can be directly—in the case of the 
persuasion and attitude change strand—and indirectly—in the case of the two other strands—
related to the formation of implicit and explicit attitudes. According to a meta-analytic study, 
implicit and explicit attitudes are more strongly correlated in the consumer domain than 
socially sensitive domains, such as stereotypes (Hofmann, Gawronski, Gschwendner, Le, and 
Schmitt 2005). In this section, we show how duality models can be conceptually linked to 
attitudes at both an implicit and explicit level. In addition to contributing to the formation of 
attitudes, duality models are also likely to affect the retrieval of implicit vs. explicit attitudes, 
depending on the type of cognitive processes individuals use (S1 or S2). 
The distinction between implicit and explicit attitudes is most directly applicable to 
the first dual processing tradition, namely persuasion and attitude change. Comparing duality 
models and dual structure attitudes, previous research has suggested the existence of a 
relationship between implicit vs. explicit attitudes and corresponding associative (S1) vs. 
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propositional (S2) processes (Gawronski and Bodenhausen 2006, 2011). In a dual attitude 
model, implicit attitudes are automatic, and explicit attitudes necessitate capacity and 
motivation (Wilson, Lindsey, and Schooler 2000). The work by Gawronski and Bodenhausen 
(2011) suggests that information processed using the peripheral/heuristic route could result in 
changes to implicit attitudes, whereas information processed using the central/systematic 
route is likely to result in changes to explicit attitudes.  
In judgment and decision making, previously formed attitudes in the form of an affect 
heuristic can be a source of information used by consumers evaluating products. Given the 
automatic nature of affect and evaluations (Zajonc, 1980, 1997), the affect heuristic and 
implicit attitudes both posit spontaneously evoked affective evaluations linked to the 
experiential system (Spence and Townsend 2008). While implicit attitudes are a measure of 
the content of the experiential system, the affect heuristic refers to the application of that 
content in decision making (Spence and Townsend 2008). The relationship between judgment 
and attitudes can be reversed, and judgments may also make a more direct contribution to the 
formation of attitudes when a consumer reasons about product attributes and the desirability 
of each attribute (Albarracín, Johnson, Zanna, and Kumkale 2005). For instance, consumers 
might make judgments about the quality of goods sold in store X being higher than for those 
sold in store Y. If the quality attribute is important to the consumer, low quality will 
contribute more to a negative explicit attitude towards store Y. 
As discussed previously (see Section 4.4), cognitive psychologists have recently 
pitted the default-interventionist against the parallel-competitive characterization of the 
Intuitive vs. Reflective model of judgment and found evidence mostly in favor of parallel-
competitive operations. Evans (2008, p. 271) notes that “parallel-competitive forms of dual 
process models seem to be rooted in the idea of two forms of learning, leading to two forms 
of knowledge (implicit and explicit), which can then lead to competing attempts to control 
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behavior” (see also Reber 1993; Sloman 1996; Smith and DeCoster 2000). To our 
knowledge, there have been no attempts to study the implications of default-interventionist 
and parallel-competitive processing in relation to implicit and explicit attitudes. One possible 
speculation could be that parallel-competitive operations in the Intuitive vs. Reflective model 
would lead to a greater dissociation between the resulting implicit and explicit attitudes. 
Default-interventionist processes, on the other hand, where S1 judgments are the default that 
may or may not be overruled by S2 deliberation, imply that S1 may be a key contributor to 
the formation of implicit attitudes, whereas S2 plays a much weaker role. This would suggest 
that understanding and assessing consumers’ implicit attitudes might be more important than 
measuring explicit, self-reported attitudes when trying to relate judgment and attitudes. 
The connection between attitudes and the impulsive system can be explained by the 
experiential nature of S1 (see, for example, Epstein and Pacini 1999, Evans and Over 1996, 
Reber 1993), which triggers implicit learning and subsequently the formation of implicit 
attitudes (Evans 2008, p. 261). Similarly, in the RIM, behavioral schemata are learned 
implicitly and activated through experience. Past research indeed suggests a relationship 
between implicit attitudes and spontaneous behaviors (Rydell and McConnell 2006). On an 
explicit level, attitudes towards brands have been shown to influence intentions to purchase 
(Spears and Singh 2004). There is emerging evidence supporting a relationship between 
explicit attitudes and reflective behaviors, on the one hand, and implicit attitudes and 
impulsive behaviors on the other (see section 5.5). In addition, the RIM principle of bi-
directionality holds that “behavior may influence evaluative judgments and experiences even 
if no inferences are drawn… people’s attitudes are influenced by what they are doing even if 
they do not recognize its meaning” (Strack et al. 2006, p. 210). Consumers’ actions thus feed 
back into evaluations (see Figure 2). 
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As mentioned previously, the competitive nature of systems outlined in the RIM is 
perhaps most apparent in regret-based tensions that may occur after a behavior has been 
performed. Hence, the model implies a connection between impulsive behaviors and attitudes 
via post-purchase or post-consumption processes, most notably cognitive dissonance 
(Festinger 1957). For example, a consumer may consider himself health-conscious but then 
purchase unhealthy food; another person might have bought a television that she thought had 
great image quality but then sees a negative review about that television set. The experienced 
dissonance can be reduced if the consumer changes his or her explicit attitudes (Gawronski 
and Bodenhausen 2006). 
Overall, implicit and explicit attitudes provide an integrative way to understand how 
the three strands can be connected together. From persuasion and attitude change to judgment 
and decision making and eventually consumer behavior, S1 processes are likely to contribute 
to the formation or retrieval of implicit attitudes, while S2 processes are likely to contribute 
to the formation or retrieval of explicit attitudes (Albarracín, Wang, Li, and Noguchi 2008). 
6.3 Summary 
While debates persist about the extent to which duality models from different domains 
map on to each other (e.g. Evans 2008), our discussion of similarities and differences—as 
well as our integration of duality models with implicit and explicit attitudes—has shown that 
they can arguably be connected in several ways, via the inputs and outputs of attitudes, 
judgment, and behavior formation processes. Figure 2 summarizes our propositions and 
offers a conceptual model that integrates duality models from a consumer psychology 
perspective. As argued previously, there is a greater conceptual differentiation at the S1 level 
(intuitive/experiential vs. impulsive/hot) than at the S2 level (reflective/analytic/cool) for dual 
system theories. 
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In sum, we suggest a mutual influence between explicit and implicit attitudes, which 
may be formed as a result of the central (systematic) and peripheral (heuristic) processing of 
marketing communications, as well as processes in the dual systems of judgment and buying 
behavior. The left side of our model shows that explicit attitudes affect intentions directly, via 
S2 reflective processing. Implicit attitudes are connected indirectly to intentions in the form 
of automatically generated affect in the experiential S1. S2 judgments (e.g. in the evaluation 
of alternatives), on the other hand, contribute to explicit attitudes (e.g. depending on the 
desirability of evaluated information such as product attributes). In addition, experiential S1 
is related to implicit attitudes through the concept of implicit knowledge. 
The dual system view on the right of the model shows that conceptual and emotional 
content, generated automatically by S1, feeds into S2 processes via ease of access and 
automatic affect. S2, in turn, can influence S1 by directing attention. Our model depicts 
intentions and behavioral schemata as antecedents of action, as outlined by Deutsch and 
Strack (2008). Thus, S2 can also keep S1 in check by regulating behavior via intentions, 
while conceptual and emotional cues are linked to behavioral schemata directly on an S1 
level. Since behavioral schemata are intermediate between intentions and action, impulses 
may intervene late in the decision making process. Finally, consumer behavior feeds back 
into S1 and S2 evaluations. This may occur both on an experiential S1 level, in the form of 
implicit learning, and on an S2 level, where evaluations can be made explicit by the 
consumer (e.g. as a result of cognitive dissonance reduction). 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
7. Future Research Directions 
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For marketing scholars, understanding the duality of mind and the role of deliberative 
and automatic processes in consumer persuasion, judgment, and buying behaviors means 
capturing more of the phenomena that consumer psychologists are trying to explain, allowing 
us to deepen our understanding of the different aspects of the consumer decision making 
process. In addition, for marketing practitioners—who have traditionally assumed that 
consumers would consciously and reflectively react to marketing stimuli—this means 
improving the efficiency of marketing practices by allowing for the effective two-way 
processing of product-related information. The aim of this section is to discuss research 
implications that could help to solve some of the issues identified in our review and in the 
consumer research literature. 
1) Should dual processing in consumers’ intuitive vs. reflective judgments about 
products be characterized as default-interventionist or parallel-competitive? What is the 
implication of this for the formation of implicit vs. explicit attitudes? While the nature of S1 
and S2 in each of the three strands is relatively unquestioned, the relation between S1 and S2, 
especially with respect to the order and simultaneity of the two systems, is still being debated 
(Evans, 2007, 2008). A number of cognitive psychologists have tested whether Evans’ 
default-interventionist or parallel-competitive view is more characteristic of dual processing 
in the heuristics and biases tradition (Intuitive vs. Reflective model). Evidence thus far seems 
to favor parallel-competitive operations (see section 4.4). In order to clarify this issue further, 
consumer psychologists could engage in domain-specific tests, for example by replicating 
research conducted on the ratio bias (Ferreira et al. 2006; Bonner and Newell 2010) to 
consumer judgments (Burson et al. 2009). To achieve this aim, individual differences in the 
functional dependence of S1 vs. S2 processing (Ferreira et al. 2006) could be connected to 
implicit vs. explicit attitudes, testing whether a dissociation between S1 and S2 judgments 
can be related to a dissociation between implicit and explicit attitudes. This would not only 
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contribute to the emerging debate on the dynamics of S1 and S2 processes, but also could 
enhance our understanding of duality in attitudes (see section 6.2; see also Wilson et al. 
2000). 
2) Do attitudes towards brands moderate intuitive vs. reflective judgments in 
consumers’ evaluation of products? One of the key issues to address in order to understand 
how the different strands of research can be integrated together is to look at how the three 
strands can be related to common consumer variables, such as attitudes (see section 6.2). In 
our paper, we have outlined ways in which implicit and explicit attitudes can be connected 
with duality models, showing for instance how the Experiential vs. Analytic model in 
judgment and decision making focuses on the role of implicit attitudes in the form of an 
affect heuristic. Yet, consumer research on other general purpose heuristics (i.e. availability, 
representativeness, and anchoring) has not considered the moderating effect of relevant 
implicit or explicit attitudes, formed as a result of past marketing exposure, non-marketer 
input, or consumption experience. Consequently, future research could investigate how 
consumer attitudes relate to anchoring mechanisms, for instance. It might be expected that 
consumers who hold strong (either negative or positive) attitudes towards a brand would be 
less susceptible to anchors (e.g. Madzharov and Block 2010; Wansink et al. 1998) designed 
to influence purchase quantity of that brand. 
3) How is cognitive dissonance experienced in a post-purchase phase, as well as 
consumer satisfaction, related to dual processes? The three strands discussed in this paper 
can be mapped on to consumer decision making stages, but a clear understanding of how 
duality models can inform the final, post-consumption stage is still lacking. Given previously 
suggested relations between impulse buying, regret, and cognitive dissonance, and the fact 
that a change in explicit attitudes can ease cognitive dissonance (Gawronski and 
Bodenhausen 2006), investigating this area should help researchers to clarify the role of S1 
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and S2 in post-purchase cognitive dissonance. Could S1 dominance at each of the steps of the 
consumer decision making process increase the likelihood of experiencing post-purchase 
cognitive dissonance? Does a reliance on S2 processes, by contrast, reduce the experience of 
dissonance? Another interesting area for future research would be to look at the way 
consumers process advertising for a product that they already own, and then investigate how 
this is related to their product satisfaction. Are satisfied customers more likely to use an S1 
route when processing information for a product they already own, due to reduced situational 
involvement? Owning a product could also trigger a temporary high involvement with the 
product and its category, leading to an increased reliance on S2 processes to establish 
whether or not the purchase decision was a good one. 
4) How do S1 and S2 processes contribute to the formation of personal vs. extra-
personal associations? Olson and Fazio (2004) argue that individuals sometimes hold 
associations that are salient in their memories but may not contribute to the formation of 
attitudes, which they label extra-personal associations. Conversely, personal associations are 
associations of thoughts that are linked with consumers’ attitudes towards a particular object. 
Existing evidence supports Olson and Fazio’s typology in a consumer context, suggesting 
that brand attitudes and brand associations are two different concepts which are not 
necessarily related (Czellar, Voyer, Schwob, and Luna 2009). The role of S1 and S2 
processes in understanding how personal and extra-personal brand associations are formed 
and retrieved in processes of attitude formation is currently unknown. Understanding whether 
S1 and S2 processes contribute to brand attitudes, and do so in the form of personal and/or 
extra-personal associations, will enhance the current understanding of the concept of personal 
vs. extra-personal associations, and of consumers’ knowledge structure. A possible 
relationship between the concepts would be that S1 contributes to the formation of extra-
personal associations, while S2 contributes to the formation of personal associations. This 
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could also further inform our understanding of dual attitudes, as previously discussed (Wilson 
et al. 2000). 
5) What is the role of consumer expertise in moderating impulsive vs. reflective 
consumer behavior? Duality models in the areas of both persuasion and judgment typically 
show the importance of expertise in the evaluation of information, thus strengthening 
systematic/reflective processes at the expense of heuristic ones. Although knowledge is a 
factor in the RIM’s conceptualization of S2 processes, an understanding of the role of 
category/domain-specific or general consumer expertise in reducing impulsive behavior 
appears to be lacking in empirical research building on this model. General marketplace 
expertise (e.g. Feick and Price 1987) may be particularly relevant to understanding behaviors 
independently of product categories. Does consumer expertise have a similar (positive) 
effect, as personal relevance or involvement, on S2 processing? Is there an interaction effect 
between expertise and available cognitive resources in predicting impulsive consumer 
behavior? Answering these questions will improve our understanding of the moderators of S1 
and S2 in the buying and consumption behavior strand, as well as the integration of different 
duality strands. 
6) What is the role of personal relevance or purchase importance in moderating 
intuitive vs. reflective and experiential vs. analytic judgments in consumers’ evaluation of 
products? Duality models in the persuasion strand and the RIM on consumer behavior assign 
an important role to consumer motivation, as evident in personal relevance or purchase 
importance, which increases the likelihood of S2 processing. It appears, however, that no 
empirical work on general purpose heuristics applied to product judgments has taken these 
variables into account. Similar to the previous question (5), researching the moderating role 
of these variables would improve our understanding of S1 and S2 processing in the judgment 
and decision making area, as well as contribute to the integration of the three duality strands. 
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7) What is the role of retail adjacencies in predicting impulsive vs. reflective 
consumer choices? While retail environments have been used for field experiments by 
marketing scholars, many consumer psychologists—especially those researching 
impulsiveness—still prefer to rely on laboratory studies using isolated target objects, usually 
in the form of traditional virtue vs. vice (i.e. hedonic) stimuli. Although research on impulse 
buying has been interested in the wider choice environment and marketer-controlled cues 
(e.g. Youn and Faber 2000), future dual processing research on impulsive vs. reflective 
consumer behavior could investigate the effect of adjacencies—the proximity of other types 
of products to the target product (e.g. Underhill, 2008) —on consumer choices. For example, 
researchers may explore how perceptual input and attention (e.g. via eye tracking technology 
in shelf display studies), as suggested by the Hot/Cool model, allows the reflective S2 to 
regulate consumer behavior vis-à-vis S1 impulses. This would inform researchers on how 
characteristics from the retail environment interact with duality models. 
 8) How does S1 vs. S2 buying relate to behavioral brand loyalty? Marketing scholars 
interested in predicting repeat purchasing behavior typically consider impulse buying and 
variety seeking as factors that are negatively associated with behavioral loyalty (Uncles, 
Dowling, and Hammond 2003). Both of these behaviors can be driven more by feelings than 
reasoning, but people who are high self-monitors are more likely to seek variety and are less 
likely to buy impulsively (Sharma, Sivakumaran, and Marshall 2010). This suggests that 
impulse buying and variety seeking can be mapped on to different S1 and S2 processes, with 
impulse buying reflecting S1 behaviors, and variety seeking reflecting relatively more 
motivated (S2) behaviors. Habitual buying and planned purchasing behavior, on the other 
hand, could be seen as respective S1 and S2 counterparts that are positively related to loyalty. 
Given the connection between S1 and implicit attitudes, as well as S2 and explicit attitudes 
(see section 6.2), future research could clarify the relationship between S1 behaviors (impulse 
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buying, habitual buying) and implicit attitudes towards brands, as well as S2 behaviors 
(variety seeking, planned purchasing) and explicit attitudes towards brands. Ultimately, 
research might allow practitioners to better understand repeat purchasing (i.e. behavioral 
loyalty) as a result of dual processing alongside other relevant attitudes like satisfaction, 
commitment, and involvement (e.g. Rundle-Thiele and Bennett 2001). 
9) How does habit affect S1 vs. S2 processing across duality models? Are there 
emerging behavioral patterns that favor S1 processing across models? Habit is a potential 
facilitator of S1 impulse in the RIM. For example, a consumer may habitually go to a 
supermarket to purchase dinner only five minutes before having to catch the train home after 
work, making impulse purchases more likely to occur. Although we are not aware of 
persuasion dual process studies that have incorporated habit, some behaviors can indirectly 
affect peripheral/heuristic processing by reducing cognitive resources. Habitually surfing the 
Internet whilst watching television, for instance, should decrease the ability of S2 to process 
TV ads systematically and increase S1 reliance. Given the emerging behavioral patterns in 
favor of unplanned purchases that have been noted at a societal level (e.g. Underhill 2008), 
and simultaneous media consumption at a generational level (e.g. Nicholas et al. 2011), it 
would be interesting to explore cross-generational differences in these potentially interrelated 
habits or behavioral trends in relation to consumer duality models. 
 10) How consistent are consumers in relying on S1 vs. S2 strategies across the three 
strands? Since our review is the first to connect duality models in persuasion, judgment, and 
buying behavior, it opens up an interesting—albeit ambitious—avenue for future research to 
integrate different aspects of dual processing across consumer decision making stages. More 
specifically, consumer psychologists could investigate the degree to which consumers’ 
propensity to rely on either type of processing (S1 vs. S2) is associated across the three 
strands. A possible way of testing this would be to set up a series of experiments involving 
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exposure to advertisements, product judgments, and eventually actual choice under known 
conditions affecting the use of S1 vs. S2 processing (e.g. limited vs. unlimited time). This 
could also lead researchers to examine the relationship between typical dispositional 
variables used in the literature (e.g. need for cognition, consumer expertise, or cognitive 
ability) and dual processing across models. Conducting this type of research would be subject 
to methodological challenges, such as target category and task selection, stimuli design, and 
cross-model equivalency in measurement levels, but it has the potential to make a valuable 
contribution to our understanding of duality of mind among consumers. 
 
8. Conclusion 
The aim of this paper was to advance knowledge on duality models in consumer 
psychology. We offered a systematic review of duality models across three strands: 
Persuasion and attitude change, judgment and decision making, and buying and consumption 
behavior. For each strand, we presented an overview of the two systems or processes, as well 
as recent advances in the field. We further integrated the literature by comparing and 
contrasting the nature of S1 and S2 processes, their interaction, and the nature of their 
moderators. We also discussed how the three strands can be connected to implicit and explicit 
attitudes. Finally, we offered an overview of the research questions that could be addressed in 
order to deepen our understanding of duality models applied to consumer psychology and 
marketing. 
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APPENDIX 
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Figure 1. Overview of Duality Models in Consumer Psychology
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Figure 2. Integration of Duality Models in Persuasion & Attitude Change, Judgment & Decision Making and 
Buying & Consumption Behavior, including Dual Attitudes
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Table 1: Comparison of Duality Models in Persuasion & Attitude Change, Judgment & 
Decision Making and Buying & Consumption Behavior 
 
 
 Persuasion and Attitude 
Change 
Judgment and Decision 
Making 
Buying and 
Consumption Behavior 
Model 
[Structure] 
 
Elaboration Likelihood 
(ELM) 
[N/A] 
Intuitive vs. Reflective 
[Default-Interventionist] 
Reflective-Impulsive 
(RIM) 
[Parallel-Competitive] 
 Heuristic vs. Systematic 
(HSM) 
[Parallel-Competitive] 
Experiential vs. Analytic 
[Parallel-Competitive] 
Hot/Cool 
[Default-Interventionist] 
  
Process    
Inputs Information and cues 
(acquired from brand 
initiated communication, 
other customers or expert 
sources) 
Information and cues 
(e.g., product features) 
Information and  
internal (imagination) or 
external (perception) 
consumption stimuli or 
cues 
Process/ 
System 1 
Automatic associations; 
reliance on salient cues 
and easily accessible 
information / heuristics 
(e.g., source 
attractiveness, message 
length, design and 
aesthetics) 
Automatic and easily 
retrieved content; 
impressions and gut 
feelings (general 
purpose heuristics) 
Automatic activation of 
content (conceptual and 
affective clusters), 
leading to approach or 
avoidance 
Process/ 
System 2 
Logical evaluation of 
evidence; computation 
and comparison (e.g., 
scrutiny of message 
content, quality of 
arguments, accuracy of 
comparison process) 
Logical evaluation of 
evidence; computation 
and comparison (e.g., 
weighing of costs and 
benefits)  
Logical evaluation of 
evidence; computation, 
comparison, planning and 
choice (e.g., evaluating 
desirability and 
feasibility; purchasing 
 intentions) 
Output Attitudes Judgments Behaviors 
 
Conditions and moderators affecting S1 vs. S2 Processing 
Enduring Need for cognition 
Knowledge & expertise 
Goals 
Self-schemas 
Counter-factual thinking 
Intelligence 
Critical thinking ability 
Cognitive Reflection Test 
Knowledge & expertise 
Trait self-control 
Working memory 
capacity 
Self-regulation (e.g., 
restraint standards) 
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Regulatory focus Regulatory focus 
Habit 
Situational Cognitive load, time 
pressure 
Involvement/Relevance 
Regulatory focus 
Arousal 
Mood  
Cognitive load, time 
pressure 
Training 
Regulatory focus 
Priming 
Mood 
Cognitive load, time 
pressure 
Involvement (purchase 
importance) 
Accountability 
Visceral states (e.g., 
intoxication) 
Need deprivation 
Regulatory focus 
Priming 
Mood 
 
Marketing Applications   
Typical Place 
in Consumer 
Decision 
Process 
Information 
exposure/search 
Evaluation of 
alternatives 
Choice/purchase 
Potential 
Marketing 
Domains 
Marketing 
communications  (esp. 
advertising) 
Word-of-mouth 
Branding 
Packaging design 
Customer satisfaction 
Product design 
(features) 
Branding 
Product mix 
Pricing 
Packaging design 
Website (ecommerce) 
design 
Sales promotion 
Product design 
Packaging design 
Sales promotion 
Store layout and website 
(ecommerce) design 
Customer loyalty 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
1 The distinction between dual process and dual systems theories is mainly one of scope, with dual systems 
views essentially conceptualizing the operations of two “minds” under which dual processes are subsumed. 
 
2 As of October 2012, a Google Scholar search for the keywords 'Petty Elaboration Likelihood' returned 17,200 
results, and only 7,560 for a search with keywords 'Chaiken Heuristic Systematic'. 
 
3 The judgment and decision making area of research has given rise to other dual process models, most notably 
‘fuzzy trace’ theory (Reyna 2004). This model’s origins were relatively specialized and domain-specific (risk 
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perception in the domain of health) and it has to our knowledge not been adopted by researchers interested in 
consumer decision making. 
 
4 In option framing, consumers tend to choose a higher number of options when using a delete mode (starting 
from a fully loaded model, then removing undesirable options) vs. an add mode (starting from a base model, and 
then adding desirable options). A study by Biswas (2009) showed this bias to be more pronounced when 
participants were motivated to make decisions in a strictly emotional rather than a logical manner.  
 
5 PDP is a methodological tool designed to separate the contributions from automatic and controlled processes 
by means of an inclusion condition (both processes acting together) and exclusion condition (processes acting 
separately). Whereas problems used in judgment research are usually exclusion problems (a S1 response is in 
opposition to a S2 response, for example, one product with a high base failure rate resembling another product 
with a lower rate), inclusion versions can be constructed by changing the original version so that S1 and S2 
judgments lead to the same response output. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
